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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

ILLINOIS
Alderson v. Fatlan, 898 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. 2008) (holding that riparian
rights generally do not accompany an ownership interest in land abutting an artificial body of water unless the state recognizes the body of
water as a natural watercourse).
The dispute between appellants-petitioners Robert and Wanda Alderson (the "Aldersons") and appellees-respondents Leo Fatlan and
four neighboring homeowners (jointly, "Fatlan"), involved the determination of whether riparian rights accompanied the Aldersons' ownership interest in a portion of a man-made lakebed. The man-made
lake at issue was originally a sand quarry. Fatlan purchased the entire
quarry property in 1968, excluding a portion of the northeast end that
crossed onto the McElvain family lot. The McElvains never disputed
the quarry's incursion onto their property. In 1974, Fadan discontinued mining operations and permitted the quarry to fill with water,
which resulted in the man-made lake at issue. Approximately seven
years later, Fatlan sold four residential lots on the south side of the
quarry, and built a home for himself on an adjacent lot. Fatlan and the
neighboring homeowners have since used the man-made lake exclusively for recreational purposes.
The conflict between Fatan and the Aldersons arose when the Aldersons purchased the McElvain property in 1998. Two years later,
after failed attempts to quiet title to the Aldersons' property by adverse
possession, Fatlan and the other homeowners blocked the Aldersons'
access to most of the lake by installing a restrictive fence through the
lake along the Aldersons' property line. As a result, the Aldersons filed
suit against Fatlan and the other homeowners claiming, among other
things, that they had a right to the reasonable use and enjoyment of all
the surface waters of the man-made lake because they owned a portion
of the lakebed.
The Circuit Court of Will County determined that the water-filled
quarry at issue was a lake. Therefore, the circuit court held that the
Aldersons, as owners of a portion of the lakebed, had rights to the reasonable use of the surface waters of the entire lake. The Appellate
Court for the Third District reversed the circuit court's judgment and
remanded the case for an entry of summary judgment for Fatlan and
the other homeowners. The appellate court stated that the water-filled
quarry was not a body of water "of natural origin," and thus, not a lake.
Therefore, the appellate court found that the Aldersons' ownership
interest in a portion of the lakebed did not give them rights to use all
the surface waters of the water-filled quarry. The Aldersons appealed
the appellate court's ruling.
At the outset of its discussion, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted
that other jurisdictions had developed two different approaches to resolving the rights of riparian owners whose property abuts the shore of
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a lake and includes a portion of the lakebed. The first approach, the
common law rule, states that the owner of a portion of the lakebed
only has the right to the exclusive use and control of the waters located
above that property. Illinois, however, follows the second approach,
the civil rule, which states the owner of a portion of a lakebed is entitled to the reasonable use of the entire surface of the lake.
Next, the court determined that the water-filled quarry was a manmade lake. Therefore, the court stated the issue was whether riparian
rights extend to a man-made lake. Generally, riparian rights do not
extend to owners of property abutting an artificial lake because it
would be inequitable to give property owners rights to a body of water
that someone else created, merely because their property touches the
water. However, the court explained an exception to the general rule,
recognized as the "artificial-becomes-natural rule," may apply in certain
situations. Courts may recognize an artificial body of water as a natural
watercourse if: (1) the body of water is of a permanent character; (2)
the circumstances under which the original party created the body of
water indicate the intent to make the body permanent; and (3) people
have consistently used the body of water with such an intention for a
significant period of time. The court also noted that other courts have
only applied the artificial-becomes-natural rule when the party seeking
to invoke the rule has used the artificial body of water without dispute
for a significant period of time.
The court concluded that the artificial-becomes-natural rule did
not apply to the case at bar because the Aldersons had not used the
man-made lake for a long period of time, and the Aldersons' use of the
man-made lake had been a matter of dispute since their purchase of
the McElvain property. Further, the court stated the Aldersons could
not argue that they had used the man-made lake as a permanent body
of water for a significant period of time by tacking on the years during
which the McElvains owned the property, because there is no evidence
the McElvains used the man-made lake. While the Aldersons argued
their ownership of the lakebed was sufficient to entitle them to use the
entire lake, the court disagreed stating the adoption of such a ruling
would lead to inequitable results. Lastly, the court noted that the AIdersons did not have rights to the man-made lake as a result of a grant,
easement by prescription, or easement by implication. Thus, the court
affirmed the judgment of the appellate court in favor of Fatlan and the
other homeowners.
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KANSAS
Frank v. Kan. Dep't. of Agric., 198 P.3d 195 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming the district court holding that the Kansas Division of Water
Resources acted within its authority and was entitled to deference,
where the chief engineer's interpretation of an ambiguous Kansas stat-

